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ALJ Central Panels: How is it Going Out There?* 
 
Hon. W. Michael Gillette** 
 
For over 40 years, administrative law mavens have touted the 
desirability of “central panels,” i.e., panels of administrative law 
judges who, instead of being attached to a single administrative 
agency, are assigned to a “central,” “independent” panel that supplies 
administrative law judges to conduct contested case hearings for a 
variety of agencies. 
The concept of the separate, independent body of administrative 
law judges was sold to various states on a variety of theories, the 
most important of which were (1) such panels would be free — and 
be perceived to be free — of undue interference from the agencies for 
which they worked, thereby promoting confidence in the decisions 
that their judges made;1 (2) the very fact that such panels served a 
variety of agencies would promote cross-training and increase 
competence in the judges, in the same way that trial judges in the 
traditional court system usually are “generalists” who are able to call 
upon lessons learned in one kind of case to help solve other cases; 
                                                            
* Originally published in The Judicial Edge, a publication of The National 
Judicial College  
** Justice Gillette achieved senior status as an appellate judge in 2011 and 
serves pro tempore in the Oregon trial courts. He is a member of the regional law 
firm of Schwabe, Williamson and Wyatt, where he is a shareholder in the 
commercial litigation practice group and is involved in the firm’s mediation and 
arbitration practice. Justice Gillette has served as faculty for The National Judicial 
College since 1980 and was the 2006 recipient of the College’s Payant Award for 
Excellence in Teaching. 
 Chief Judge Ann Wise of the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law puts 
it this way: “The justification for an independent central panel is basic fairness; it is 
not fair to combine into one person or political entity all of these powers: to 
investigate (like police), to decide whether to bring charges (like grand juries), to 
prosecute (like district attorneys), and to decide guilt or innocence (like judges or 
juries).” Wise, Louisiana’s Division of Administrative Law: An Independent 
Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 30 J. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 95, 96 (2010). 
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and (3) the variety of work would attract a more capable and 
ambitious group of applicants for positions as administrative law 
judges. 
More than half the states have listened to the siren call and have 
created such panels — the earliest (California’s) as far back as 1946. 
As one who at first opposed, but later supported the creation of such 
a panel in his home state, Oregon, the author now rises to ask the 
following question: What have we wrought, and is it working as 
advertised? 
 
I. A REPORT FROM THE HINTERLANDS 
 
First, let us consult that most reliable of sources — anecdotal 
information. 
The author, accompanied by his wife and partner-in-crime, Judge 
Toni Boone, has had the opportunity, both in NJC classes in Reno 
and in various other venues across the country, to talk to central 
panel administrators and judges about their experiences. Most are 
enthusiastic about the outward success of the decision to remove 
them from the various agencies that they serve — the appearance of 
fairness, at least, is significantly improved. 
But a number of ALJs2 are less sanguine about the actual 
relationship of their panel with at least some of the agencies they 
serve. Those ALJs report that they feel pressured to rule in favor of 
the agencies, at least in part because the central panel’s budget is 
made up of incremental “payments” for the central panel’s services 
by the agencies that they serve.3 In such circumstances, the agency is 
the panel’s “customer,” and there is an ongoing concern that, if it is 
dissatisfied with the panel’s work, the “customer” may attempt to 
take its business elsewhere. The practice of deriving a panel’s 
funding in whole or in part from the budgets of the agencies it serves 
seems legitimate: it permits the legislature to keep track of the extent 
                                                            
 For simplicity, this article uses the familiar label, “ALJ” (for “Administrative 
Law Judge”), although some central panels may use other designations for their 
adjudicators. 
 In one case, central panel ALJs reported that their supervisor required them 
to provide the supervisor with pre-release copies of any opinions that ruled against 
a state agency. 
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to which an agency’s administrative adjudications absorb state 
revenue. If, however, the agency retains the right to separately hire 
ALJs, rather than use the central panel’s personnel,4 the central 
panel’s budget (and, hence, its survival) is dependent on the good 
will of its customers. 
As noted, the foregoing concerns are based on anecdotal evidence 
and information. They cannot be confirmed without creating 
difficulties for the reporting ALJs, and (assuming that the reports are 
true) they surely represent only a small fraction of the thousands of 
cases heard annually by central panel ALJs. But someone needs to 
put the concerns in print, if only to raise the consciousness of other 
ALJs and bolster the determination of most central panel members 
and their supervisors to fiercely protect their independence. 
The second goal of the centralizing process — cross training for 
more utility and flexibility — appears to have succeeded in some 
places, but not others. (At least, not yet.) Initially, there were 
difficulties with persuading new central panel ALJs, many of whom 
had been transferred from where they had traditionally been housed 
within particular agencies, that they needed to learn new areas of the 
law. In addition, each agency customer wanted its own particular 
needs filled by someone who wasn’t a “beginner” respecting the 
agency’s applicable law. However, those problems tended to resolve 
over time, as some ALJs retired and their replacements began work 
in an atmosphere in which cross-training was the norm. But cross 
training is a luxury. The panel has work to do, and it can do it most 
efficiently if it assigns ALJs to particular agency hearings based on 
the ALJ’s previous experience. The long-term goals of more 
sophisticated, more flexibly available ALJs thus must be 
accomplished incrementally, if at all. Literature on the topic is very 
limited. There is a need for a report on this from those in the field, so 
that those of us who advocate central panels can try to identify 
strategies for accomplishing the cross-training goal. 
                                                            
 Of course, some central panel-enabling legislation specifically assigns 
particular agency adjudications to the jurisdiction of the central panel. But even 
that degree of connection is not necessarily permanent: an agency may have 
sufficient political “clout” to obtain a legislative release from the jurisdiction of the 
central panel. 
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The third goal — a better group of candidates for ALJ positions 
— is the hardest of all to evaluate. Certainly, the central-panels ALJs 
and supervisors who have been students in classes that Judge Boone 
and I have taught are an impressive bunch. However, they are also a 
self-selecting group: they want to be good at their jobs, and seek 
classes that will improve their skills. Still, those students come from 
so many different jurisdictions that it seems fair to label this goal of 
the centralizing process as one that is advancing satisfactorily.5 
 
II. THE LAW OF UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES 
 
Finally, it would be wrong to omit a reference to at least one 
unexpected consequence to the centralization process: the struggle 
over “deference.” 
As a general proposition, most traditional courts, when 
conducting judicial review of administrative decisions, give at least a 
dip of the knee to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules and 
even, on occasion, to an agency’s interpretation of statutes that it is 
required to enforce. The degree of deference varies enormously from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the idea of it is constantly present: 
agencies routinely ask for “deference.” 
And there’s the rub. When an agency’s decision is, in fact, the 
decision of an independent ALJ from a central panel, what theoretical 
justification can there be for any form of deference? The usual 
justifications are an agency’s particular “expertise” in an area of the 
law, or an agency’s particular knowledge of what it meant to 
accomplish by its own rules. But those rationales have no place in 
judicial review of an independent ALJ’s disposition of an agency’s 
contested case. The ALJ has no more expertise than does the 
reviewing court, and the ALJ has no peculiar insight into the meaning 
of a regulation, because she or he did not write the regulation. In such 
                                                            
 Speaking only for himself, the author wishes to note that there is one flaw in 
this situation: central panels are almost all limited, by law, to hiring law school 
graduates. This is a foolish limitation, particularly because many of the skills that 
an adjudicator needs are not taught in law school. The work of an ALJ requires 
intelligence and effort, not a law degree. The author has met far too many superior 
ALJs who were not (as one friend describes it) “JD impaired” to believe that the 
potential pool of candidates should suffer this artificial limitation. That said, I 
acknowledge that I am shouting into the wind: “It is what it is.” 
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circumstances, traditional concepts of “deference” may go the way of 
the dodo.6  Certainly, it seems fair to say that that particular 
consequence was not in the minds of most advocates or opponents of 
the central panel system. 
Although a good deal has been written about the central panels of 
various states (and the District of Columbia and the cities of New 
York, Salt Lake City, and Chicago, all of which have versions of 
central panels), those of us who have supported or opposed central 
panels (and, as noted, the author did both) remain unsure as to what 
we’ve created. For many of us, the issue lies less with the quality of 
panel decisions — the judicial review process seems adequate to that 
task — than with how the panels really work and whether the goals 
many of their advocates set for them have actually been realized. It 
may be that the answer to our questions lies in the province of other 
disciplines — political science, for example — but, wherever it lies, 
we sure wish someone would take on the task. 
 
How is it going out there? 
 
                                                            
 For a particularly charming review of this conundrum, see A. Michael 
Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel Jurisdictions: Is there a 
Deference?, 29 J. National Association of Administrative Law Judges 1 (2009). 
Judge Nolan was a veteran ALJ in the Maryland Office of Administrative 
Hearings. 
 
